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Spencer v. Klementi, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 35 (July 9, 2020)1  
 
Summary 
 In an opinion drafted by Justice Cadish, the Nevada Supreme Court considered whether 
public-comment periods of planning-commission and improvement-district meetings are quasi-
judicial proceedings. The Court concluded that public-comment motions of the meetings are not 
quasi-judicial given that they lacked the basic due-process protections that are normally found in 
a court of law.  
 
Background 
 This case arose out of a neighborly dispute that began when appellant built a fence 
around his property. Respondents complained about appellant’s fence at the Douglas County 
Planning Commission meetings. At a later board meeting, respondents alleged that Spencer, who 
operated the District’s snowplow, retaliated by blocking their driveways with snow and used to 
snowplow to cover one of the respondents with snow.  
 The dispute later culminated when appellant allegedly battered the respondent. 
Respondents then again complained about Spencer at the Douglas County Planning Commission 
meetings. Soon after, the district attorney’s office charged appellant with a misdemeanor battery, 
and later enhanced the misdemeanor battery to felony elder abuse and added two more charges 
of elder abuse.  
 Respondent filed a civil complaint against appellant, seeking recovery for personal 
injuries. Appellant then filed a malicious prosecution counterclaim, alleging that they falsely 
accused him of criminal activity. One of the respondents then moved for summary judgement on 
the malicious prosecution counterclaim. After the district court heard the deputy district attorney 
testify that the respondent did not influence her decision to initially charge and prosecute the 
appellant, the district court granters the respondent’s motion for summary judgment and granted 
attorney’s fees.  
 Next, the district court granted respondents moved for summary judgment on the 
remaining malicious-prosecution counterclaims. The district court found that respondents’ 
statements were protected under the judicial-proceeding privilege, which precludes liability for 
defamation. Appellant challenged the district court’s summary judgment orders. 
 
Discussion 
Summary judgment in favor of malicious-prosecution counterclaim  
 
 Appellant argued that there was a genuine issue of material fat about respondent’s 
participation in his criminal prosecution. The Court reviewed the lower court’s summary 
judgement de novo.  
 Respondent argued that there was insufficient evidence to establish any of the elements 
necessary to prevail on a malicious-prosecution claim. Respondent attached various evidence 
that successfully pointed out that there was insufficient evidence to support appellant’s 
counterclaim and met her burden as the moving party for summary judgment. However, in his 
 
1  By Nina Hebibovich.  
opposition, appellant argued that respondent was actively involved in the continuation of his 
criminal prosecution, and therefore met Malicious-prosecution claim element. However, the 
Court held that the respondent calling the police after witnessing potentially illegal behavior de 
not establish that she played an active role in the district attorney’s decision to amend the 
criminal complaint. Thus, appellant failed to meet his burden of showing a genuine dispute of 
material fact, and the Court affirmed district court’s summary judgement. 
 
Summary judgement in favor of respondents’ defamation counterclaims 
 Appellant argued that Nevada has never extended the absolute privilege that attaches to 
judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings to statements made during the public-comment period of 
county meetings. The Court reviewed the separate summary judgments de novo.   
 The Court upheld that none of respondents’ statements were defamatory or untrue, but 
that the judicial-proceedings privilege nonetheless protected their statements. The only 
statements that respondents did make were all statements of fact. Appellant did not present any 
evidence that the statements made about snow removal were untrue or that there were additional 
defamatory statements. Her merely alleged that the respondents did not have firsthand 
knowledge of such accusations. However, general allegations are insufficient to survive 
summary judgment.  
 However, the district court did err in granting summary judgement to two of the 
respondents. At a public meeting discussing snow removal, two of the respondents alleged that 
they saw the appellant speeding and put the blade down to splash one of the respondents’ face. 
However, unlike the other respondents, these respondents did not argue that their statements 
were true or otherwise defamatory. Instead, they argued that the judicial-proceedings privilege, 
which provides absolute immunity for statement made during judicial and quasi-judicial 
proceedings, protected their statements. The Court addressed whether the judicial-proceedings 
privilege applies in this context where respondents did not address the elements of appellant’s 
defamation counterclaim.  
 Prior to this case, the Nevada Supreme Court never expressly defined a quasi-judicial 
proceeding in the context of defamation suits. Thus, the Court clarified that a quasi-judicial 
proceeding in the context of defamation suits is one that provides basic due-process protections 
parallel to those provided in a court of law. To qualify as a quasi-judicial proceeding for 
purposes of absolute privilege a proceeding, at minimum, must: allow an opportunity to present 
and rebut evidence and witness testimony, require that such evidence and/or testimony is 
presented upon oath, and allow both parties to cross examine, impeach, or confront witnesses.2  
 Here, the public comment period of the county meetings provided parties the opportunity 
to present personal testimony, however, did not require an oath or affirmation. Additionally, 
while both parties could speak freely during the public-comment periods, neither was subject to 
cross-examination or impeachment. Given that these public-comment periods lacked basic due-
process protections typically found in a court of law, they were not quasi-judicial.  
 Moreover, the Court did not apply the judicial-proceedings privilege based solely on 
public policy. Statements made during proceedings that lack due-process protection typically do 
not engender just or reliable outcomes. Thus, based on the fact that the public-comment periods 
lacked basic due-process protections, the Court concluded that public policy considerations do 
not weight in favor of applying the judicial-proceedings privilege in this matter.  
 
2 See Knox v. Dick, 99 Nev. 514, 517-18, 665 P.2d 267, 269-70 (1983). 
 The Court concluded that the absolute privilege that typically attaches to judicial and 
quasi-judicial proceedings does not apply in this case, and thus reversed the district court’s order 
granting summary judgment for respondents.  
 
Attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b) 
 
 Under, NRS 18.010(2)(b)3, the district court awarded respondent’s attorney feeds after 
granting her motion for summary judgement on the malicious prosecution counterclaim. 
Additionally, the court awarded respondents’ attorney fees after granting summary judgment on 
the remaining counterclaims, including the defamation counterclaims. Appellant challenged both 
awards of attorney fees, which the Court reviewed for abuse of discretion.  
 The Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the court did not abuse its discretion 
when it awarded attorney fees to respondent on the malicious-prosecution counterclaim. NRS 
18.010(2)(b)4 authorizes an award of attorney fees to respondent given that appellant brought a 
claim without reasonable ground. It was found that Spencer’s malicious-prosecution 
counterclaim was groundless given that there was probable cause to criminally prosecute him, 
thus he could not prove a necessary element of his counterclaim.  
 
Conclusion 
 The Court concluded that meetings that lack basic due-process protections that one would 
normally find in a court of law are not quasi-judicial. The Court reversed orders that relied 
exclusively on this privilege. The Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
on appellant’s defamation claims that relied on statements that were untrue. Additionally, the 
Court affirmed appellant’s claim on summary judgment regarding malicious-prosecution, given 
that the district court did not erroneously apply the law.  
 
3 NEV. REV. STAT. 18.010(2)(b). 
4  Id. 
